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Outbreaks of invasive infections caused by group A β-
hemolytic streptococcus (GAS) may occur in long-term
care settings and are associated with a high case-fatality
rate in debilitated adults. Targeting antibiotic treatment only
to residents and staff known to be at specific risk of GAS
may be an ineffective outbreak control measure. We
describe two institutional outbreaks in which mass antibiot-
ic treatment was used as a control measure. In the first
instance, mass treatment was used after targeted antibiot-
ic treatment was not successful. In the second instance,
mass treatment was used to control a rapidly evolving out-
break with a high case-fatality rate. Although no further clin-
ical cases were seen after the introduction of mass antibi-
otic treatment, persistence of the outbreak strain was doc-
umented in one institution >1 year after cases had ceased.
Strain persistence was associated with the presence of a
chronically colonized resident and poor infection control
practices.
G
roup A β-hemolytic streptococcus (GAS) has a long-
standing association with pharyngitis, skin and soft
tissue infection, and pneumonia (1–3). In the past decade,
reports of  GAS-associated necrotizing fasciitis and strep-
tococcal toxic shock syndrome (TSS) have increased (2,4).
Increasingly, outbreaks of invasive GAS are recognized in
long-term care facilities (5–10). In the Canadian province
of Ontario, 4% of invasive GAS cases occur in long-term
care facilities, and of these cases, one third are outbreak
associated (5). In long-term care settings, a high case-fatal-
ity rate has been observed (40% to 60%) (5,11,12).
Guidelines for control of GAS outbreaks in nursing
homes were developed by the Ontario Ministry of Health
in 1995 (13). These guidelines emphasize the identifica-
tion and elimination of colonization through providing
antibiotics to those known to be carriers of the bacterium.
Although such an approach should minimize antibiotic
exposure, carrying it out in practice could be difficult, as
cultures may be falsely negative (14), and persons could
become colonized or transmit colonization to others in the
interval between culturing and treatment. Antibiotic treat-
ment of all residents and staff would not be subject to such
limitations. We present two outbreaks of invasive GAS
infection in long-term care facilities in Hamilton, Ontario,
Canada. Each was caused by transmission of a single well-
characterized outbreak strain, and in both cases, mass
antibiotic treatment was used to control the outbreak.
Methods
Epidemiologic Investigations
In the province of Ontario, invasive infections with
GAS (isolation of GAS from blood or an otherwise sterile
site) and cases of suspected TSS and necrotizing fasciitis
must be reported to local public health authorities (15).
Reports of invasive GAS infection originating from long-
term care institutions in the city of Hamilton resulted in an
epidemiologic investigation by the City of Hamilton
Social and Public Health Services Department. In the two
outbreaks described below, investigations consisted of site
visits with line-listings created to identify facility residents
and staff; reviews of recent admissions, discharges, and
deaths among residents; and reviews of reports of illness
among residents and staff. Environmental investigations
and reviews of infection control practices were also per-
formed.
Attempts were made to identify facility residents and
staff with close epidemiologic linkage to the index patients
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University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada(e.g., caregivers, roommates, and close friends). Although
typically only persons with epidemiologic linkage to index
patients are cultured for possible GAS carriage, the cir-
cumstances described below resulted in more widespread
collection of culture specimens. Specimens were obtained
from noses and pharynges of residents and staff, and
attempts were made to obtain cultures of perirectal areas
and wounds in facility residents. In the second outbreak
described below, staff provided self-collected rectal and
vaginal swabs.
Microbiologic Evaluation and 
Characterization of GAS Strains
Swabs from institution residents and staff were plated
onto blood agar, with group A streptococcus identified by
β-hemolysis and Lancefield typing using standard com-
mercially available latex agglutination methods, as
described elsewhere (16). Isolates were subsequently eval-
uated for relatedness by using pulsed-field gel elec-
trophoresis (PFGE). Briefly, PFGE was performed using
fresh overnight cultures of GAS strains. Isolates were sus-
pended in buffered saline, and solutions were adjusted in
volume until optical densities (OD) were identical (1.6 OD
at 610 nm). To prepare genomic DNA, 500 mL of cell sus-
pension from each strain was mixed with an equal volume
of 2% low melting agarose solution. The agarose plug was
prepared by using a commercially available plug mould
(Bio-Rad Canada Limited, Mississauga, Ontario, Canada).
All GAS plugs were treated in lysis buffer containing 50
mg/mL lysozyme at 37°C overnight, extensively washed
in washing buffer, and then treated in a solution containing
50 µg/mL protease K at 55°C overnight. All plugs were
extensively washed before being restricted by Sma-I
enzyme. PFGE was run by using a 1% agarose gel at 6
volts/cm; run time was 26 h with an initial switch time of
20 s and a final switch time of 60 s. Following gel elec-
trophoresis, the gel was stained in a solution containing 0.5
µg/mL ethidium bromide and photographed by using the
Bio-Rad Multi-analysis CCD camera system. ATCC strain
19615 was included as the quality control strain. 
M and T serologic typing and opacity factor determina-
tion were performed on all isolates with standardized
methods (17). In addition, antiopacity factor (AOF) typing
was performed on all isolates that were opacity factor-pos-
itive (17). All antisera were prepared in-house. Because of
the difficulty of producing antisera for some M types, AOF
typing has been frequently used to predict the M type
(18,19). Although AOF typing does not always have the
same type specificity as M typing, this approach is consid-
ered valid for most strains from developed countries (20).
AOF typing was used to predict the following M types: 9,
11, 25, 28, 48, 77, 78 and 92 (PT5118).
Results
Outbreak 1
In October 2000, the Hamilton public health unit was
notified of a 97-year-old female nursing home resident
(index case-patient 1) admitted to an area hospital with cel-
lulitis and group A streptococcal bacteremia. The nursing
home was a 386-bed facility in a suburban area. Cultures
were obtained as described from 87 residents and staff who
might have had contact with the person with invasive dis-
ease. One resident had a throat culture positive for group A
streptococcus. This isolate was genetically indistinguish-
able by PFGE analysis from the invasive isolate obtained
from index case-patient 1, and both strains were typed as
M77 T9/10, and positive for serum opacity factor.
Intervention consisted of reinforcement of standard
infection control practices with facility staff and treatment
of the person with pharyngeal colonization with a 10-day
course of cephalexin, 250 mg four times per day. Follow-
up cultures from this person taken 1 month after comple-
tion of treatment were negative. Index case-patient 1 died
during the course of the investigation of apparently unre-
lated cardiac disease.
In January 2001, an 87-year-old female resident of the
same long-term care facility was transported to hospital
with fever (index case-patient 2), and GAS was isolated
from blood cultures drawn at admission. Several days
later, GAS was isolated from the wound of another facili-
ty resident. Screening cultures performed on 195 residents
and staff with a history of contact with one of these two
infected persons indicated that seven residents and one
staff member were colonized with GAS. PFGE showed
that the strains from all resident carriers were identical to
the wound and blood isolates, and to the isolate obtained
from index case 1. The bacterial isolate obtained from the
staff member was determined by PFGE to be unrelated to
the outbreak strain. Colonized residents and staff were
treated with cephalexin as had been done with the previous
patient. Cultures obtained from treated persons 1 month
after completion of therapy were again negative.
In May 2001, another resident of this nursing home was
transported to hospital with GAS bacteremia (index case-
patient 3). At this time, all 386 residents and 135 staff of
the facility were screened for GAS carriage by culturing
nasopharynx specimens. Eleven residents and three staff
members were identified as carrying group A streptococ-
cus. Thirteen of these (11 residents and two staff members)
subsequently proved to be carrying strains identified by
PFGE analysis to be identical to the strain obtained from
index case-patient 2 (Figure 1) (prevalence of colonization
or infection among residents was 2.8% vs. prevalence of
colonization 1.5% among staff , p=0.38 by chi-square test).
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was a 69-year-old woman, immobilized by severe neuro-
logic disease, who had a suprapubic bladder catheter and a
gastrostomy tube. Resident A was subsequently deter-
mined to have had urine and wound cultures positive for
GAS in July 2000, 3 months before index case-patient 1
sought treatment; these isolates were unavailable for eval-
uation. After consultation with local communicable dis-
ease control experts, the public health team recommended
administering antibiotics to all facility residents and staff.
All residents were treated with a 10-day course of
cephalexin or penicillin VK, with erythromycin given to
persons allergic to β-lactam agents. Similar antibiotic reg-
imens were recommended for all staff members. No data
are available with regard to the degree of compliance with
antibiotic therapy among staff. However, all previously
colonized staff members were culture-negative for group A
streptococcus on repeat culturing 1 month later.
Ten of 11 treated residents had cultures negative for
group Astreptococcus 1 month after treatment. Resident A
remained persistently colonized at gastrostomy and
catheter sites, despite a subsequent prolonged course of
oral clindamycin. This resident was placed on contact iso-
lation precautions, with staff using gowns and gloves when
participating in her care. She died in July 2002.
No subsequent cases of invasive group A streptococcal
disease have been reported at this facility as of February
2003. However, in August 2002, GAS was identified in
cultures of eye drainage and wound drainage from three
residents of a single wing of the facility (Figure 2). PFGE
demonstrated two of the three isolates to be indistinguish-
able by PFGE from isolates obtained from resident A.
Neither of these persons had been present in the facility at
the time of invasive cases, and neither had been housed in
the same part of the facility as resident A. An audit of
infection control procedures at that time showed several
violations of standard infection control measures, includ-
ing the reuse of a single washcloth on multiple residents of
the facility.
Outbreak 2
In November 2001, the Hamilton public health unit was
notified of two deaths from invasive group Astreptococcal
disease at a 126-bed long-term care facility. The first case-
patient was a 78-year-old man who had been admitted to
the hospital with fever and possible pneumonia 2 days
before. A blood culture grew GAS. The second case-
patient was a 61-year-old man with Parkinson's disease
and dementia who had been admitted to the hospital 1 day
before with soft skin tissue infection and likely necrotizing
fasciitis. GAS was subsequently isolated from blood cul-
tures. Both patients died on the day the cases were report-
ed to the public health department.
A site visit was performed. The facility had 127 resi-
dents and 150 staff members. The two cases had originat-
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Figure 1. Molecular epidemiology of group A streptococcus (GAS)
strains in outbreak 1. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, demonstrat-
ing relatedness of group A streptococcal isolates from an person
with clinical illness from GAS, a person with chronic colonization
with GAS, and asymptomatically colonized facility staff and resi-
dents. Lanes 1 and 15 contain an ATCC quality control strain. Lane
14 contains an isolate from another nursing facility, unrelated to
outbreak 1. The isolate in lane 2 (large solid arrow) was obtained
from index case-patient 2 in January 2001. The isolate in lane 7
(large hollow arrow) was obtained from a person with chronic GAS
colonization (resident A) in May 2001. Small solid arrows denote
electrophoretically identical GAS strains from other persons with
asymptomatic colonization with group A streptococcus in May
2001. Asterisk denotes staff member.
Figure 2. Epidemic curve for outbreak 1. Clinical cases (black
bars) of invasive GAS infection occurred at intervals of 3 to 4
months. With the occurrence of cases, acquisition of culture spec-
imens resulted in identification of asymptomatic colonization with
the outbreak strain (white bars) or unrelated strains (hatched bars)
in other residents and staff. No additional clinical cases occurred
after mass antibiotic treatment (M.A.T.); resident A died (†) in July
2002; colonization of two residents with the outbreak strain was
recognized 1 month later.ed on different floors of the facility (2nd and 4th). A large
holiday party had been held in the communal dining hall 4
days previously, providing an opportunity for residents,
staff, and community members to mingle. In addition, a
healthcare worker reportedly had pharyngitis, a rash, and
desquamation of the palms and had received a diagnosis of
scarlet fever 3 weeks earlier. 
Due to the lack of any epidemiologic link between
case-patients and the population mixing that had occurred
at the holiday party, swab cultures were collected on all
facility residents and all available staff members.
Epidemic control measures were introduced and included
restriction of new admissions to the facility and reinforce-
ment of infection control practices. Based on the rapidity
of events, the apparent high case-fatality rate, and recent
experience with the failure of targeted culturing and treat-
ment (as described in outbreak 1), a decision was made to
initiate mass antibiotic treatment for all facility residents
and staff. After that decision, but before mass antibiotic
treatment could be initiated, an 89-year-old male resident
was admitted to the hospital with congestive heart failure.
Gram stain of sputum indicated gram-positive cocci in
chains. This man died 36 h after admission; GAS was iso-
lated from blood cultures taken at hospital admission
(Figure 3).
Mass antibiotic treatment was initiated approximately
48 h after the start of the investigation, with azithromycin,
250 mg orally each day, administered for 5 days to resi-
dents and to staff who wished to be treated at the facility.
Staff who wished to receive antibiotic treatment from their
personal physicians were permitted to do so. Subsequently,
GAS was isolated from nasal and pharyngeal cultures of
two staff members and five residents of the facility. GAS
was also isolated from a wound culture from a facility res-
ident.
All colonized residents were negative for GAS on
repeat cultures, 4 weeks after receiving antibiotics. One
staff member remained culture positive 2 weeks after com-
pleting a course of cephalexin provided by her personal
physician; she received two additional courses of β-lactam
antibiotics and was documented to be culture negative for
GAS 4 weeks after she completed the second antibiotic
course.
PFGE performed on the three GAS strains from case-
patients and the seven strains from colonized residents and
staff showed that four colonized persons had isolates iden-
tical to those from the deceased case-patients; all were
serotype M1 T1 and were serum opacity factor negative
(Figure 4). The remaining three isolates represented two
distinct strains unrelated to the outbreak strain. The pro-
portion of residents colonized or infected with the outbreak
strain was significantly higher than the proportion of staff
colonized (4.7% vs. 0.7%, p=0.03 by chi-square test). 
Discussion
Our description of outbreaks of multiple cases of inva-
sive disease attributable to a single, identified strain of
GAS in long-term care institutions is consistent with prior
reports (5-10). Outbreak 1 was caused by an M77 strain, an
uncommon cause of invasive streptococcal disease in
Canada (21). The second outbreak was caused by an M1-
type strain, the most common isolate type in Canada,
which may be more virulent than other serotypes (21,22). 
Epidemiologic investigation of these two outbreaks
showed a higher prevalence of colonization with the out-
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Figure 3. Timeline for outbreak 2. Solid lines represent the time of
onset and duration of illness among three cases with invasive
GAS infection in outbreak 2, relative to the initiation of the out-
break investigation (date=0). Daggers (†) denote death. Mass
antibiotic treatment (M.A.T.) was started 2 days after the investiga-
tion was initiated.
Figure 4. Molecular epidemiology of group A streptococcal strains
in outbreak 2. Pulsed-field gel electrophoresis, demonstrating
relatedness of group A streptococcal isolates from facility staff and
residents. Lanes 1 and 7 contain an ATCC quality control strain.
Solid arrows denote identical strains from two of the three persons
in whom fatal invasive group A streptococcal infection developed;
the third person with invasive disease had an electrophoretically
identical strain (not shown). Hollow arrows denote identical strains
from persons with asymptomatic colonization with group A strepto-
coccus. Brackets denote duplicate strains from the same person;
asterisk denotes staff member.break strains among residents than among staff, although
this difference was not statistically significant in outbreak
1. Given the limited mobility of the residents of both facil-
ities, such a difference would be consistent with disease
transmission involving asymptomatically colonized
healthcare workers. Transmission may also have occurred
as a result of transient carriage of the organism by health-
care workers, as may occur with nosocomial transmission
of Clostridium difficile and vancomycin-resistant entero-
coccus (23,24), or as a result of contaminated fomites,
such the washcloth described in outbreak 1. Other possible
mechanisms of transmission include direct resident-to-res-
ident transmission in the context of such social events as
the holiday party described in outbreak 2 and foodborne
transmission (25).
Any of these mechanisms of spread could limit the
expected effectiveness of screening and targeted antibiotic
treatment, as culturing of only residents and staff with a
clear epidemiologic link to cases would not be expected to
identify all colonized persons. This situation was well
demonstrated in outbreak 1, which involved probable
worker transmission of a strain from an immobile, chroni-
cally colonized person (resident A) to other residents in
this institution. Although likely important in the perpetua-
tion of the outbreak, resident A was identified incidentally
when cultures were performed on all facility residents 8
months after the initial case of invasive disease was report-
ed. The importance of silent carriage of GAS in the perpet-
uation of outbreaks has been well-described in both health-
care (26,27) and community (28) contexts.
Our use of mass antibiotic treatment as an epidemic
control measure appears to have been successful, inas-
much as no further cases of invasive GAS disease have
been reported from either facility at the time of writing
(February 2003). However, the documented persistence of
the bacterial strain implicated in outbreak 1 after the death
of resident A suggests that breaches in infection control
practices (as identified during site visits), combined with
the presence of a persistently colonized resident or staff
person, may limit the effectiveness of this control measure.
Such a control measure would also not prevent the repeat-
ed reimportation of a circulating community strain of GAS
into a facility by healthcare workers or visiting family
members (29,30). 
The impact of wide-scale antibiotic use on pathogenic
microorganisms in long-term care institutions also remains
an issue of concern. Resistance to macrolides among GAS
isolates appears to be increasing in frequency (31,32), and
the overuse of β-lactam antibiotics and macrolides may
adversely affect the antibiotic susceptibility patterns of such
common pathogens as Streptococcus pneumoniae (33–36).
These two outbreaks of invasive GAS in the long-term
care setting highlight the limitations of targeted culturing
and antibiotic treatment as an outbreak control strategy.
However, our experience also highlights the limitations of
mass treatment as a control strategy, particularly when
poor infection control practices persist and chronically col-
onized residents are present. Further research into the epi-
demiology and transmission of GAS in the long-term care
setting will help refine the optimal approach to managing
these challenging outbreaks.
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